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Trade Flows, Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Financial Depth:
Evidence from 28 Emerging Countries
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of real exchange rate uncertainty on man-
ufactures exports from 28 emerging economies, representing 82% of all develop-
ing country manufactures exports, and explores the sources of heterogeneity in
the uncertainty effects by controlling for the direction of trade (South-North or
South-South), and the level of financial development of the exporting country. The
empirical results show that for more than half of the countries the uncertainty ef-
fect is unidirectional, either South-South or South-North, and the median impact
is negative. In addition, while we find that financial development augments trade,
exchange rate shocks can negate this effect. Last but not the least, trade among
developing economies improves export growth under exchange rate shocks.
Keywords: Trade flows; Exchange rate uncertainty; South-South trade; Financial depth;
Manufactured goods trade; Dynamic panel data.
JEL Classification Numbers: F15; F31; G15; E44; O14
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, researchers
studying the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows have arrived at mixed
conclusions. Theoretical models predict positive, negative or no effects depending on
the underlying assumptions. Although, the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade
flows appears to be an empirical question, empirical research, too, yields mixed results.
Surprisingly, however, research on the sources of heterogeneity among countries in their
trade responses to exchange rate uncertainty has been limited. Among possible sources
of this heterogeneity we identify four issues. First, an overwhelming majority of em-
pirical research have focused on developed countries alone and only few considered the
possibility that uncertainty may have heterogenous effects on countries with different
levels of economic development (Arize et al. 2000; Sauer and Bohara, 2001; Grier and
Smallwood, 2007; Baum and Caglayan, 2009; Caglayan and Di, 2010). Second, despite
significant research showing the importance of financial development for export perfor-
mance, there is no study that controls for it under exchange rate uncertainty. Third,
the possibility that the effects of uncertainty may depend on the direction of trade (for
example South-South or South-North) is completely neglected in previous studies. Last
but not least, there is no study that takes into account heterogenous effects of exchange
rate uncertainty on manufactured goods, which not only have different long term devel-
opmental impacts but also have different response functions to exchange rate uncertainty
compared to primary goods. Therefore, instead of using aggregate exports, the prod-
uct composition of which varies significantly across countries, in this paper we focus on
manufactured goods.
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by responding to all these
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four issues. That is, first we exclusively investigate the impact of exchange rate un-
certainty on emerging country bilateral trade flows rather than those of developed
economies. Second, we differentiate the movements of trade flows between develop-
ing economies (South-South trade) in comparison to trade flows from developing to
developed economies (South-North trade). Third, given the recent evidence that finan-
cial development significantly affects the pattern of international trade and economic
growth, we control for the level of financial depth of the exporting country in our analy-
sis. In particular, we explore whether financial depth, measured by the private credit to
GDP ratio, mitigates the (potentially) depressing impact of exchange rate uncertainty
on developing country exports. Fourth, unlike the previous research, which uses (mostly
aggregated) total merchandize exports, we focus on bilateral manufactured goods ex-
ports. In our empirical analysis we also take into account the strong path dependency
in international trade flows using a dynamic panel framework.
We carry out our empirical investigation by estimating dynamic panel models for the
bilateral exports of each of the 28 emerging countries in our dataset (representing 82%
of all developing country manufactures exports) for the period of 1978–2005. Our key
findings are as follows. First, we find that exchange rate uncertainty significantly affects
exports of (up to) 24 countries (19 of which are within one and an additional 5 within
a two year window) out of 28 countries. Although we find that the median effect is
negative, there are several cases where exchange rate uncertainty has a positive impact
on export growth. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the direction of trade matters
under exchange rate uncertainty. Accordingly, in more than half of the cases exchange
rate uncertainty affects trade flows only in one direction that is either South-South or
South-North. Consistent with the previous research we also find that financial develop-
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ment enhances developing county manufactured goods exports. However, we discover
that the positive impact of financial depth on trade flows can be reversed under large
exchange rate shocks. Last but not least, we find evidence that trade between develop-
ing economies can further enhance their manufactures export growth. We confirm the
robustness of these findings to the timing of exchange rate uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
review. Section 3 introduces the model and describes the data. Section 4 discusses the
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section we present a brief summary of the related literature on the following
topics: i) the impact of exchange rate movements on trade flows; ii) the role of financial
development in trade; iii) the determinants of South-South versus South-North trade;
and iv) the structure of trade and exchange rate uncertainty relationship.
2.1 The Impact of Exchange Rate Uncertainty on Trade Flows
After the breakdown of Bretton-Woods agreement in 1973, it was argued that unexpected
movements in exchange rates—exchange rate volatility—would have adverse effects on
risk averse exporters. In particular, Ethier (1973), Cushman (1986) and Peree and
Steinherr (1989) show that an increase in exchange rate volatility will have adverse
effects on exports of risk averse firms. Contrarily, Franke (1991), and Sercu and Vanhulle
(1992) suggest that exchange rate volatility may have a positive impact on international
trade flows. Between these two positions, De Grauwe (1988), Viaene and DeVries (1992),
and Barkoulas et al. (2002) discuss the possibility of ambiguous effects of exchange rate
uncertainty on trade flows depending on the aggregate exposure to currency risk and
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the type of shocks affecting the firms.
When we turn to empirical evidence, we cannot yet arrive at a clear conclusion
either. Cushman (1983), Kenen and Rodrik (1986), Thursby and Thursby (1987) and
Peree and Steinherr (1989), among others, report a negative effect of exchange rate
uncertainty on trade flows, while Koray and Lastrapes (1989), and Gagnon (1993) find
insignificant effects. Likewise, Baum et al. (2004), and Baum and Caglayan (2010)
show that exchange rate uncertainty has slightly positive but generally insignificant
effects across countries. Klein (1990), and Kroner and Lastrapes (1993), on the other
hand, report both positive and negative effects of exchange rate volatility on exports.
Overall, the studies above only concentrate on the experiences of developed countries.
Yet, recent research by Baum and Caglayan (2009) (using aggregate exports from 16
developed and 6 emerging countries), Caglayan and Di (2010) (using bilateral sectoral
exports from 9 developed and 5 emerging countries), and Grier and Smallwood (2007)
(using aggregate exports from 9 developed and 9 emerging countries) investigate the
effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows of both developed and emerging
countries. While Grier and Smallwood (2007) conclude that the impact of exchange
rate uncertainty on trade flows of emerging economies is negative, the other two argue
that the effect is either insignificant or negligible. There are few exceptions where the
investigation is focused on emerging economies. Most notably, Arize et al. (2000) (using
aggregate exports from 13 developing countries) and Sauer and Bohara (2001) (using
aggregate exports from 22 developed and 69 developing countries) show that exchange
rate uncertainty has a significantly negative effect on emerging country exports.
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2.2 The Role of Financial Depth
Studies regarding the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows have neglected
the interactions between uncertainty and financial development despite the growing body
of research pointing out the level of financial development as a source of comparative
advantage in international trade. According to research by Kletzer and Bardhan (1987),
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck (2002), Braun
and Larrain (2004), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005), and Demir and Dahi (2010), indus-
tries that are more dependent on external finance grow faster in countries with better
developed financial systems. In particular, developing countries (the South) with low
levels of financial development are found to have lower export shares and trade balances
in industries (such as manufactures) that depend more on external finance. Given that
industries with higher external finance needs also have larger scales, higher research
and development and value-added in production, it appears that financial depth has
significant implications for development and long term growth in the South.
Naturally, the level of financial development determines the amount of credit available
for international trade. Particularly, the lack of a developed financial system increases
the transaction costs and functions as a trade barrier if none of the trading parties
can provide the trade financing (UNCTAD 2005, 2007; IMF 2009). Furthermore, with
underdeveloped financial markets, firms are more likely to suffer from currency mis-
match problems, which worsens the adverse effects of exchange rate shocks (Caballero
and Krishnamurthy, 2004). In addition, real exchange rate uncertainty (by inducing ex-
cess volatility in profits) can exacerbate the negative effects of credit constraints on fixed
investment expenditures (Aghion et al., 2009). As such, uncertainty becomes more dam-
aging to firms that have high external finance dependency but are located in countries
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with low levels of financial development. Aghion et al. (2009)’s empirical investigation
shows that exchange rate uncertainty reduces the productivity growth of manufacturing
sectors with higher financing needs more in countries with lower financial depth.
2.3 The South-South Trade
Over the last two decades, the share of Southern exports in world trade increased sub-
stantially. Between 1978 and 2005 the share of the South in world manufactures exports
increased from 5% to 32% while that of South-South manufactures exports jumped from
2% to 16%. The annual growth rate of real South-South manufactures exports has also
been significantly higher than the world average reaching 14% as opposed to 5% for the
latter (COMTRADE, 2010). In this respect, South-South trade has long been pointed
out as an untapped resource for emerging economies. Myrdal (1956), for example, ar-
gued that regional integration in the South could help emerging countries overcome local
market size limitations during the process of industrialization. It is proposed that given
the strongly skill-biased structure of output expansion in international trade (Antweiler
and Trefler 2002), increasing market size may help emerging countries enjoy scale ef-
fects and improve the skill content of their exports. Likewise, Lewis (1980) and more
recently UNCTAD (2005) suggest that South-South trade can reduce the dependence
of the South on the expansion of developed country economies—the North. Moreover,
the structure of South-South trade is argued to have dynamic and long term benefits for
emerging countries both due to its comparatively higher technology and human capital
intensive factor content (Amsden 1980; Lall and Ghosh 1989), and the presence of simi-
larities in production patterns and resource base, which facilitate appropriate technology
transfers among Southern countries (Amsden 1987; UNIDO 2005; World Bank 2006).
Interestingly, most of the theoretical research on exchange rates and South-South
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trade, including Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996), Eichengreen (1998), Mundell (2002),
Bacha (2008), and Swofford (2009) have focused on the optimal currency areas and
Southern monetary unions. Yet, none of the studies on South-South trade investigate the
relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and trade within developing economies
or between developing and developed countries. This presents an important gap in the
literature especially given the recent negotiations among various emerging countries to
start using national currencies for trade rather than hard Northern currencies (mostly
dollar and euro) to escape from the negative effects of currency fluctuations. For exam-
ple, Brazil and Argentina have recently signed bilateral agreements towards using the
peso or real in intra-Mercosur trade and established futures markets for these local cur-
rencies (Phillips 2009). Similarly, in 2009, Turkey signed a joint agreement with Russia
and Iran to start using their national currencies instead of the dollar or euro for trade.
Likewise, both Turkey and Russia are reportedly preparing to use national currencies
in their trade with China as well. The lack of research is also surprising given that
exchange rate volatility is expected to have deeper adverse effects on South-South trade
due to the presence of low levels of financial market development, and high share of
short term liabilities in developing countries.
2.4 The Structure of Trade
The recent advances in empirical and theoretical research clearly shows that “not all
goods are alike in terms of their consequences for economic performance” and the struc-
ture of trade matters for economic development and growth (Hausmann et al. 2007,
p.1). Manufactures exports, for example, are more likely to generate positive spill-overs
(such as innovation and accumulation of physical and human capital) and linkages for
development (Feder 1983; Hausman et al. 2007). Also, the level of (labor) productivity
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is much higher in manufacturing than in agriculture and services. Since the manufac-
turing industry serves as a ‘hub’ for the generation and diffusion of new technologies to
the rest of the economy, they become the engine of export and economic growth (Imbs
and Wacziarg 2003). For instance, the median (mean) share of manufactures exports in
total merchandize exports of our sample of countries increased from 26% (32%) in 1980
to 53% (46%) in 1990, 62% (55%) in 2000, and 66% (60%) in 2005. Furthermore, due
to the higher price elasticity of manufactured goods exports demand and higher degree
of international product substitutability, manufactured goods exports are likely to be
more sensitive to exchange rate uncertainty. Finally, manufacturing industries depend
more heavily on external finance for investment financing and yet developing countries
lack adequate financial development, which put them at a comparative disadvantage in
their trade with the North under exchange rate uncertainty (Aghion et al. 2009; Demir
and Dahi, 2010). For all these reasons, in our analysis we focus on the evolution of
manufactures exports rather than total merchandize goods.
3 EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 Modeling the Dynamics of Trade Flows
To investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows we construct 28
separate panels for each emerging country in our data set (allowing us to reduce the
unobserved country heterogeneity problem caused by pooling), and implement a dynamic
panel model. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable into our specification allows
us to control for the persistence of changes in trade flows. Besides our modeling choice,
as discussed in section 2, we differ from the rest of the literature in several important
aspects. First, we concentrate on the impact of real exchange rate uncertainty on trade
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flows of emerging countries.1 Second, we test the effect of financial development on
trade flows under exchange rate shocks by including an interaction variable between
exchange rate uncertainty and financial depth. Third, we analyze the differential effects
of exchange rate uncertainty on South-South trade vis-a`-vis South-North trade. Fourth,
we explore whether South-South trade (versus South-North) has any differential effects
on emerging country exports. Our baseline model takes the following dynamic form:
xij,t = α0 + β1xij,t−1 + β2yj,t + β3si,t + β4σi,t−1 + β5Southj + β6(Southj × σi,t−1)
+ Vij,t + νj + 
(i)
j,t
(1)
where xij,t, yj,t denote the log difference of real manufactures exports from country i to
j at time t, and the logarithmic real per capita GDP growth of the importing country,
respectively. The log difference in annual average effective real exchange rate of country
i is represented by si,t. Given that the trade data are annual and that the exchange rate
uncertainty is generally shown to achieve its greatest effect on trade within a year, we
construct an uncertainty proxy that incorporates monthly variations in exchange rates
up to a year and denote it with σi,t−1 (Baum et al. 2004). South is a dummy variable
set to 1 if the importing country is a developing economy, and 0 otherwise. Vij depicts
other control variables including the log of importing country population and exporting
country urbanization rate (for data definitions and sources, please refer to the appendix).
In this model the exchange rate uncertainty enters into the equation on its own and in
interaction with the South dummy. The interaction term allows us to test if uncertainty
affects South-South trade different from South-North trade.
Next, we augment our baseline model with a measure of financial depth, Credit,
1We use real exchange rates instead of nominal exchange rates as the real exchange rate measures
the relative cost of tradable goods (which is what matters for international trade) as opposed to the
relative value of monies. In this context, one may arrive at erroneous conclusions should the focus be
on the effects of movements in nominal exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows.
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to test its importance for trade growth under exchange rate shocks. In particular, we
implement two separate models. In the first case we allow Credit to enter the model on
its own and in interaction with uncertainty so that we can test if financial depth could
mitigate or worsen any adverse effects of exchange rate uncertainty on emerging country
trade flows. The model that we estimate takes the following form:
xij,t = α0 + β1xij,t−1 + β2yj,t + β3si,t + β4σi,t−1 + β5Southj + β6(Southj × σi,t−1)
+ β7Crediti,t + β8(Crediti,t × σi,t−1) + Vij,t + νj + (i)j,t
(2)
where the rest of the elements of the model is the same as in Equation (1). We then
allow Credit to have a separate effect on trade with South by introducing two additional
interactions; Credit× South and Credit× South× σ as shown below:
xij,t = α0 + β1xij,t−1 + β2yj,t + β3si,t + β4σi,t−1 + β5Southj + β6(Southj × σi,t−1)
+ β7Crediti,t + β8(Crediti,t × σi,t−1) + β9(Crediti,t × Southj)
+ β10(Crediti,t × Southj × σi,t−1) + Vij,t + νj + (i)j,t
(3)
Differing from Equation (2), Equation (3) allows us to investigate the impact of credit
depth when the country is trading with the North and South separately. Furthermore,
we can explore whether exchange rate uncertainty can annul or even negate the total
effect of credit depth on trade flows. By the same token, we can study if the impact of
exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows to North and South is mitigated or aggravated
as we incorporate financial depth into the model.
3.2 Data
We carry out our empirical investigation using annual real (non-zero) manufactures
exports data (SITC 5-8) from 28 emerging countries, which account for 82% of all devel-
oping country manufactures exports to the rest of the world (126 to 226 countries), and
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76% of all South-South exports during 1978-2005.2 Over the period of investigation, we
observe a steady increase in the sample countries’ share in global manufactures exports
going up from 4% in 1978 to 29% in 2005. The data on manufactured good exports
are obtained from the U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). Our
dataset spans the period 1978 to 2005, and includes 11 countries from Latin America
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Uruguay, Venezuela), 7 countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Al-
geria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey), and 10 countries from East and
South East Asia (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand). In choosing these emerging economies, the follow-
ing factors were considered: a) the presence of a sufficiently diversified production and
export structure, b) the availability of at least 10 years of continuous data (to avoid
non-random entry and exit bias), and c) regional representation to avoid sampling bias.3
Our choice of the time period analyzed is conditioned by the data availability. In ad-
dition to our key questions of interest, the country sample also allows us to discuss the
role of geographical location or the impact of development on the role of exchange rate
movements in trade growth.
We extract consumer price indices and spot foreign exchange rates from the IMFs
International Financial Statistics (IFS). The effective real exchange rate, also obtained
from the IFS, is based on trade weights. In a few cases including for Argentina, Brazil,
2Excluding observations where bilateral exports are zero, as is commonly done in Gravity approach
to trade, may introduce a bias in the estimations (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Tenreyro, 2007). The
reason for their exclusion is because it is impossible to interpret correctly the meaning of zero and/or
missing observations as it is impossible to know whether a zero (missing) observation is really zero or
simply missing. Therefore we carry out our estimations after eliminating zero and missing observations
from our data.
3For example, Sauer and Bohara (2001) find that exchange rate uncertainty is significant in Latin
America and Africa but not in Asia.
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Chile, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Turkey and Uruguay, exchange rate data
are gathered from the Bank for International Settlements, domestic statistical institutes,
and central banks. When the multilateral rate is not available the real exchange rate
is computed from the spot exchange rate and local and US consumer price indices for
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Syria, and Thailand.4 The effective real exchange rate is
expressed as an index with 2005 as the base year and an increase is a real appreciation.
The export data are expressed in current US dollars and we employ country specific
export price deflators (from WDI) to generate real exports.
Turning to the measurement of exchange rate uncertainty, the empirical literature
offers a number of competing approaches for its construction including methods such as
the simple moving standard deviation of the series. However, this proxy gives rise to
substantial serial correlation in the measure. In this study we implement the GARCH
model to capture the volatility clustering often found in exchange rate series. Prior to
estimation of the GARCH model, we scrutinize the time series properties of the data
to determine the appropriate characterization regarding the order of integration of each
exchange rate series. Given the presence of unit root, we compute the GARCH (1,1)
model for each country in our dataset on the log difference of monthly real exchange
rate series and use their annual averages in the regressions as our measure of exchange
rate uncertainty.5 Figure 1 presents the annual average exchange rate uncertainty for
4We would like to note that the use of bilateral exchange rates with respect to the US does not
create a significant problem in our investigation as most world trade is heavily denominated in US
dollar. As a robustness test we calculated bilateral real exchange rates with respect to the US for a
subset of countries in our dataset and generated the corresponding bilateral volatility measures. We
find that the cross correlation between the multilateral and bilateral real exchange rate volatility is 0.99
for Indonesia, Korea, Mexico and Venezuela, 0.98 for Thailand, 0.97 for China and Philippines, 0.94 for
Malaysia, 0.88 for Paraguay, and 0.83 for Costa Rica, averaging 0.95 all together.
5It would be preferable to generate a measure of uncertainty based on bilateral real exchange rates
for each of the trading partners. However, this is not feasible because of data unavailability as it requires
monthly price indexes for 28*226 country pairs going back to 1978.
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all 28 countries as well as for eight leading economies in each geographical region in the
sample. As one can observe from the figure, our uncertainty proxy differs substantially
across countries.
Insert Figure 1 Here
We use the ratio of real private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
intermediaries to real GDP, Credit, as a proxy for financial development. This proxy,
used by several researchers including Beck et al. (2000), Levine et al. (2000), Beck
(2002), Svalery and Vlachos (2005) and Braun and Raddatz (2007), captures the extent
of financial development of the exporting country, and is considered the most standard
measure of financial development. In our investigation the North includes high-income
OECD countries while the South includes all low and middle income countries according
to the World Bank definitions. Finally, in order to limit the impact of outliers, we
dropped those observations of real (non-zero) exports (in levels) that were below the
1st percentile, and real export growth rates that were below or above the 1st and 99th
percentiles.6
In Tables 1 and 2 we provide summary statistics on the variables that enter the
analysis. We can see from Table 1 that the average annual real manufactures export
growth is quite high for many countries and falls between 3.22 (Venezuela) and 23.38
(Indonesia). For the case of Syria the growth rate is negative and can perhaps be
explained by the existing trade sanctions. When we look at the growth rate of trade flows
to the South the figures are slightly higher; the growth rate of real exports falls between
4.46 (Venezuela) and 24.24 (Indonesia). The same figures for North are between 0.55
6Trimming the data at the top and bottom 1% percentile leads to only a marginal reduction in
sample size (i.e. 2.4% on average). Regression results when we use the full data are similar to those
reported in the text and are available upon request.
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(Argentina) and 24.68 (China). For a number of countries, namely Algeria, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Venezuela, trade growth with North is negative over this period. Average
total trade growth for all countries is 11%, and with the South it is 11.3%. The last
column shows that the number of trade partners for each country ranges between 126
and 226.
Insert Table 1-2 Here
In Table 2, we provide further information on other variables that enter into our model.
Column 1 shows that the average manufactures exports to GDP ratio ranges between
0.5% (Algeria) and 94.7% (Singapore). Column 2 presents the average ratio of manufac-
tures exports to total merchandize exports. For some countries this ratio is very small
such as Ecuador (1.2%), Algeria (2.0%) while for some others it is quite high such as
Hong Kong (84.1%), South Korea (82.9%) and China (80.5%). The next two columns
present the average percentage share of manufactures exports that goes to South and
North separately. These ratios are generally balanced except for Mexico whose 91.9%
of trade is with the North given that 88% of its exports go to the US alone. Column 5
provides real GDP per capita (in PPP terms) where Hong Kong and Singapore stand
out from the rest of the countries with their GDP per capita levels of around $21,000.
Column 6 depicts credit depth in each country allowing us to see that there is substan-
tial variation across countries. We see that for only a few countries the ratio of private
credit to real GDP is above 50%, including China, Hong Kong, Jordan, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, Thailand and Tunisia. Column 7 depicts our measure of exchange
rate uncertainty, which differs substantially from country to country. Given the country
heterogeneity, we expect to find that exchange rate uncertainty affects their trade flows
differently. In the last two columns we provide information on population and urban-
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ization, reflecting market size, and the degree of urban versus agrarian development.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Throughout our empirical implementation, we employ the two-step system GMM dy-
namic panel data estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998),
and use the second to fourth lags of variables as level and difference instruments. We
limited the number of instruments given that remote lags are not likely to provide
much additional information and that the power of overidentification test is weakened
as instrument count increases relative to the sample size (Roodman, 2009a). Using the
system GMM method we aim to control for any possible parameter endogeneity, state-
dependence, and simultaneity bias as well as to correct for the correlation between the
lagged dependent variable and country specific effects and the error term.7
We compute robust two-step standard errors by the Windmeijer finite-sample cor-
rection method. The reliability of our econometric methodology depends crucially on
the validity of the instruments, which can be evaluated with the J-test of overidentifying
restrictions. A rejection of the null hypothesis that instruments are orthogonal to errors
would indicate that the estimates are not consistent. Given that the model we imple-
ment has a dynamic panel data context, we expect the presence of a first order serial
correlation. However, we should not detect a second-order serial correlation so that the
instruments are not correlated with the errors. For each model we check the J-statistic
for overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano and Bond AR(2) tests and make sure
7Our modeling choice and estimation methodology allow us to avoid these common problems that
are faced by the Gravity equation approach to international trade (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). We
have identified the lagged dependent variable with GMM type instruments, and others with standard
instruments.
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that our instruments are appropriate and there is no second order serial correlation.8
The Table 6 in the appendix presents the traditional Hansen test results for overidenti-
fying restrictions, which shows that the p-value for this test is always above 10% level
except for China, which is significant at the 7% level for the model given in table 5. We
also report in Table 7 the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity, which tests whether
the subset of instruments used in the level equations are exogenous.
Finally, we note that, in addition to the lagged dependent variable, we include three
types of independent variables in our models: those that are cross-section and time vari-
ant (i.e. yj,t), those that are time invariant but cross-section-variant (i.e. Southj),
and those that are time-variant but cross-section invariant (i.e. σi,t). As a result,
the error term includes three parts: cross-section and time variant, time invariant but
cross-section-variant, and time-variant but cross-section invariant. Here we have several
specification issues to deal with: autocorrelation problem (i.e. lagged dependent vari-
able being correlated with the error term), possible correlation between the unobserved
time/cross section-variant error term and the observed variables, reverse causality and
endogeneity. In this setting, OLS, fixed and random effects will yield biased results.
Two-step system GMM method, however, is expected to deal with these issues and
generate unbiased results (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2009b). Furthermore, we choose not
include year dummies in our modeling as they will fully absorb the impact of cross-
sectional invariant regressors. Our approach does not yield any bias in the estimated
coefficients as long as the cross-sectional invariant variables are sufficient to capture all
year effects and saves on the degrees of freedom as we do not estimate year-effects.9
8The results for Ecuador should be taken with caution since it fails the AR(2) test.
9This approach is in the same vein as that of Acemoglu et al. (2003).
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4.1 Basic Specification
In this section we first discuss results obtained from equation (1). Using this model,
we investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows originating from
emerging economies to the rest of the world and discuss its impact on exports to South
and North separately. Within this framework we also scrutinize if South-South trade
has any trade enhancing or impeding effect on emerging countries. Given that we run
separate panels for each country in our dataset (28 in total), in Table 3 we only provide
information on the impact factors of exchange rate uncertainty in South-North and
South-South trade as well as on the importance of trade with South for export growth
(the details of all regressions results are available upon request). The impact factors are
measured as the net effect of one standard deviation increase in exchange rate uncertainty
on bilateral export growth. Also, Table 3 as well as Tables 4 and 5 contain information
on the number of instruments used, number of trading partners in each model, and
number of observations.
Insert Table 3 Here
Inspecting Table 3 we see that exchange rate uncertainty significantly affects trade
flows of 18 out of 28 countries—the effect is significant and negative for Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Philippines, and South Korea; and
positive for Syria, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Indonesia, and
Singapore. Considering all countries, we observe that the median impact of exchange
rate uncertainty on trade flows is negative. When we explore the effect of uncertainty
on South-South trade, we find that the median impact is still negative (eight negative
versus four positive cases) but that towards North is positive (seven positive versus five
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negative cases). Looking at the impact factors, the parameter estimates are also found
to be economically significant. Accordingly, for the statistically significant parameter
estimates, a one standard deviation increase in exchange rate uncertainty reduces South-
South export growth by 5.2 percentage points while it increases South-North export
growth by 8.9 percentage points for the median country in our sample. Furthermore,
inspecting columns one and two we can see that for two thirds of the time the effect of
uncertainty on trade flows is only in one direction, South-North or South-South.
Overall, while these findings provide support to the claim that exchange rate uncer-
tainty affects trade flows emanating from emerging countries negatively, the evidence is
not as strong as earlier research suggests (see, for example, Arize et al. 2000, and Sauer
and Bohara, 2001). First, our results show that the effects of exchange rate uncertainty
on developing country exports may be positive or negative. Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, we discover that the trade effects of exchange rate uncertainty may very
well depend on the direction of trade (South-South versus South-North), which may
explain the heterogenous findings in the empirical literature.
The third column of Table 3 allows us to check whether South-South trade enhances
or mitigates exports of an emerging economy. Note that this is a joint test of the hy-
pothesis that (β5 + β6 × σi,t−1) is significantly different from zero at the mean value of
exchange rate uncertainty. If the effect is insignificant (none), then trade with South has
a similar impact to that of North on export growth. If the effect is positive (negative),
then we can say that trade with the South enhances (impedes) manufactures export
growth of developing countries. Inspecting column three, we see that South-South trade
enhances trade growth of 11 emerging economies at economically and statistically sig-
nificant levels. The point estimates suggest that the median (mean) trade enhancing
20
effect of S-S trade is 5.9 (5.6) percentage points for these countries. Only one country,
Singapore, experiences a reduction in its trade growth as it trades with the South. This,
however, is because of the presence of a strong negative effect of exchange rate uncer-
tainty that the interaction term (β6 × σi,t−1) captures. Hence, the case of Singapore (as
well as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Philippines, and South Korea, in column two) shows
that exchange rate shocks can significantly reduce South-South trade growth. As dis-
cussed in section 2.1, to overcome such negative effects of exchange rate shocks, several
emerging countries are currently beginning to use their own currencies rather than hard
currencies when they trade with each other.
Should we look at the importance of trade with the South for emerging economies
from a regional stand point, we observe significant positive effects for almost all East
and South East Asian countries including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South
Korea, and Thailand, which are considered as the engine of growth in the world economy.
Similarly, for the Latin American countries positive effects of trade with South are
reported for Argentina, Brazil, and Columbia. In the case of MENA, the two largest
NICs, Egypt and Turkey both display a positive response to South-South trade. For the
remaining countries, we observe that trade with South under exchange rate uncertainty
does not have an additional impact on trade growth. These findings provide reasonable
support to the view that trade with South can further enhance growth patterns of
emerging economies.
4.2 Augmenting the Model with Financial Depth
We next augment our basic model by introducing a control variable for the level of
financial development (Credit) of the exporting country. Here we examine two different
models. In the first case, different from Equation (1), we introduce Credit on its own and
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in conjunction with exchange rate uncertainty as depicted in Equation (2). In our final
model, we allow the affect of Credit to differ between South and North by interacting
these two terms with South as shown in Equation (3). These models allow us to test
the claim that financial depth would have a mitigating impact on the linkages between
exchange rate uncertainty and trade flows as Aghion et al. (2009) suggests. Additionally,
we investigate if financial depth enhances trade growth.
4.2.1 Case 1: The Role of Financial Depth
Table 4 presents the results for Equation (2) where we augment our basic model with
Credit and the interaction of Credit with exchange rate uncertainty. Inspecting columns
1 and 2 we see that exchange rate uncertainty affects trade flows of 17 out of 28 countries.
In the case of South-South trade we find that the median effect is negative (8 out of 13
cases) with an impact factor of -0.048, which is economically and statistically significant.
On the other hand, in South-North trade we encounter an even number of negative and
positive (7 versus 7) cases with a median impact factor of 0.019. Of the 17 cases, seven
countries respond to exchange rate uncertainty only in one direction—three negative
cases for South-South, and two positive and two negative cases for South-North—and the
rest responds in both directions (five positive and five negative cases). The findings using
the augmented model also help explain the heterogenous results in previous research on
uncertainty-trade relationship. Different from Table 3, once we control for the level
of financial development, we now discover that exchange rate uncertainty significantly
affects export growth of Argentina, China, Hong Kong, India, Paraguay, and Singapore,
in at least one direction. Also, in contrast to our earlier findings the unidirectional effects
of uncertainty disappears for Mexico, Philippines, South Korea, and Uruguay.
Insert Table 4 Here
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Column 3 presents the total impact of Credit on trade growth. To determine the
overall effect of credit on trade flows we test the joint hypothesis that (β7+β8×σi,t−1) is
equal to zero at the mean value of exchange rate uncertainty (σi,t−1). We find that the
total effect is positive for 6 countries including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Philippines,
Syria, and Venezuela. Surprisingly, the effect is negative for 7 countries including Colom-
bia, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Singapore, South Korea, and Turkey. When we take a
step back and consider the sign and the size of the interaction term between Credit and
exchange rate uncertainty, we observe that the total impact of these countries yield a
negative sign due to the presence of a large negative coefficient on the interaction term.
This shows that exchange rate shocks can annul or negate the positive effects of financial
depth on export growth. It is possible that the adverse effects of exchange rate uncer-
tainty in these emerging economies are amplified due to the existence of intermediate
levels of financial development rather than fully operational financial markets, which
make them more exposed to exchange rate shocks and credit market failures (Joyce and
Nabar, 2009 and Aysun amd Honig, 2011).
Finally, we concentrate on the impact of trade with South. Similar to our findings
in the benchmark model, we see that trade with South has economically and statisti-
cally significant manufactures export enhancing effects for emerging economies (with the
median point estimate being 0.057). We now find that there are 11 cases where trade
with South has a significantly positive effect on export growth. There are two countries
(Singapore and Syria) whose overall trade growth is negatively affected as they trade
with the South. As in the previous case (see the discussion for the role of trade flows to
South for results in Table 3) the effect of South-South trade is negative for Singapore
due to the presence of a negative exchange rate shock.
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4.2.2 Case 2: The Role of Financial Depth for North and South
Table 5 presents our results for Equation (3) where we differentiate the total effects of
real exchange rate uncertainty and financial depth on trade flows towards North and
South. We start our investigation inspecting the impact of exchange rate uncertainty
on trade flows. Looking at Columns 1 and 2, we see that exchange rate uncertainty
affects exports of 19 (12 negative and 7 positive) out of 28 countries including Egypt,
Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Venezuela, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Similar to Tables 3 and 4, for few countries uncertainty affects trade flows both to North
and South simultaneously (three positive, three negative, and one with opposite signs)
while in others the effect is either for North (four negative, three positive) or South
(four negative, two positive). When we consider South-South and South-North trade,
we find that the median effect is negative; for the South-South trade there are 8 negative
versus 4 positive cases (with a median impact factor of -0.054) and for the South-North
trade there are 7 negative versus 6 positive cases (with a median impact factor of -0.043).
Given these results presented in Table 5, it appears that exchange rate uncertainty exerts
a broader impact on trade flows of emerging economies in comparison to those shown
in Tables 3 and 4. Furthermore, these results further underline our previous findings
that both the direction of trade and the level of financial development matters under
exchange rate uncertainty.
Insert Table 5 Here
Turning to the effect of financial development, in Columns 3 and 4, we provide
information on the effect of Credit on trade flows when the country is trading with the
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North or South. To determine the effect of financial depth on trade with the North
and South we test the significance of (β7 + β8 × σi,t−1) and (β7 + β8 × σi,t−1 + β9 ×
Southj + β10× Southj × σi,t−1) at the mean value of exchange rate uncertainty. Overall
we find that there are 15 significant cases where trade credit affects trade flows (for
one country the effect is in opposite directions for South-South and South-North trade).
Of these 15 cases, 9 countries experience a positive impact on their trade growth as
financial depth increases, yet 7 countries experience a negative effect. In particular,
Column (3) shows that the total effect of financial depth on trade with North is positive
for 8 countries (Syria, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, China, and
Philippines) yet for 5 countries (Morocco, Turkey, Columbia, Indonesia and Singapore)
we find that the effect is negative, rendering a reduction in export growth. Column
(4) presents the overall effect of Credit on trade flows towards South and shows that
only 3 countries (Indonesia, Mexico, and South Korea) experience a reduction in their
exports whereas 5 countries (Syria, Argentina, Brazil, Philippines and Venezuela) enjoy
an increase in their export growth. Here, too, the negative effects of financial depth on
trade flow is mostly a consequence of adverse exchange rate shocks which is captured by
the interaction terms.10 Overall, the point estimates suggest that a one percentage point
increase in Credit growth leads to 0.4 and 0.3 percentage points increase in South-North
and South-South export growth for the median country, respectively.
The last column of Table 5 depicts the impact of South on trade flows. Similar
to our findings in the previous models, we find that South-South trade has a trade
enhancing effect for emerging economies. We find that there are 12 cases where trading
with the South significantly affects export growth. For 10 countries (Turkey, Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea and Thailand)
10The range of coefficient estimates for β7 is (-12.35, 3.10) in Table 4, and (-6.72, 9.39) in Table 5.
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the effect is positive and for 2 countries (Syria and Mexico) the effect is negative.11 Of
the negative cases, Mexico’s results are due to the presence of negative interaction terms
with uncertainty (i.e. South× σ and Credit× South× σ) despite significantly positive
South-South effects (South and Credit × South). The negative effect for Syria can
possibly be explained by the presence of regional preferential trade agreements between
Syria and other Arab states in the Middle East that cause trade diversion. Last but not
least, the parameter estimates of the South-South trade effect is found to be consistent
with those from Table 3 and 4, and show that for a median country the effect is 0.068.
4.2.3 Robustness Tests
To check for the robustness of our findings, we repeat the analysis presented in Tables 3-5
using a twice lagged uncertainty measure to capture the effect of variations in exchange
rates between the 12th and the 24th months rather than in the first 12 months. Thus,
instead of assuming that exchange rate uncertainty shows its effects in one year for all
countries, we extended it to two years and found that timing does indeed mater for
several countries. In general our results (which are available upon request) are similar
to those reported in the text, yet we find that a slightly smaller (and different) set of
countries are affected by exchange rate uncertainty. Moreover, we find that while the
effect of exchange rate uncertainty disappears for up to nine countries after one year,
for some others (i.e. up to five countries) this effect becomes significant in a two year
window. These observations suggest that the timing of the volatility effect differs across
different countries as it is possible that exchange volatility can take more than a year to
affect trade flows for some countries while for some others the impact could be observed
more quickly. Hence, the results from this set of regressions that take into account
11Singapore dropped from our list due to the presence of a strong multi-collinearity problem.
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any delayed effects of exchange rate volatility along with our earlier findings provide a
stronger support for the significant effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows.
In total, for a maximum of 24 countries (19 within a one year window and an additional
5 countries within a two year window) out of 28 countries exchange rate uncertainty
has a significant effect on trade flows in at least one direction—South or North (for
more than half of the cases, the effect is unidirectional). Though there are cases where
the effect is positive, the median effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows is
negative in both South-North and South-South trade.
When we turn to the impact of financial depth on short term export growth, we
came up with similar conclusions that financial depth has heterogenous impacts on
trade flows. Yet, there are several countries where the total impact of financial depth is
found to be negative. Similar to previous results, this mostly results from a significantly
negative interaction term with uncertainty. That is to say it is the negative exchange
rate shocks, which cannot be absorbed fully by the financial markets that render the
coefficient of Credit negative. Finally, similar to our results in Tables 3-5, we observe
that South-South trade enhances growth in emerging economies.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on emerging country
manufactured goods exports, and explore four possible sources of heterogeneity among
countries in their trade responses to uncertainty. These are: i) the level of economic de-
velopment of trading countries, ii) the level of financial development, iii) the direction of
trade (South-South versus South-North), and iv) the structure of trade. In addition, we
take into account the path dependency in international trade. We conduct our empirical
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analysis using bilateral manufactures exports data from 28 emerging economies to the
rest of the world covering the period between 1978-2005, and employ country specific
measures of exchange rate uncertainty (generated using the GARCH methodology) and
financial development (measured by the ratio of real private credit by deposit money
banks and other financial intermediaries to real GDP). We estimate all models by the
system GMM method.
Our key findings are as follows. First, we find that exchange rate uncertainty sig-
nificantly affects trade flows of (up to) 24 out of 28 countries and the median effect is
negative. However, we should note that there are several cases where the overall impact
of exchange rate uncertainty is positive. Second, our results clearly show that the di-
rection of trade matters under exchange rate uncertainty. Accordingly, in a majority of
cases uncertainty affects trade flows only in one direction that is either South-South or
South-North. Third, the adverse effects of exchange rate uncertainty are not necessarily
mitigated by financial depth, and instead there is evidence that the negative effects can
be amplified at intermediate levels of financial development. Fourth, consistent with
previous research we also find that financial development enhances developing county
manufactured goods exports. However, it turns out that the positive impact of financial
depth on trade flows can be reversed under large exchange rate shocks. Last but not
the least, we find evidence that trade between emerging economies can further enhance
their manufactures export growth.
For future research, further empirical investigation using other developing countries
would be useful to understand if our findings are limited with only emerging countries at
higher levels of industrial development or are applicable to other less developed countries
as well. In addition, replicating this study using more disaggregated manufactured goods
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data can help us unveil differences in exchange rate uncertainty responses of low, medium
and high skill manufactured goods exports, which have different long term developmental
effects.
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Appendix
1. Data Definitions and Sources
Exports: The bilateral manufactures exports data are extracted from COMTRADE
(and OECD for Turkey). Total merchandize exports series are from WDI database. All
raw data are in current U.S. dollars. In converting to real values we used exports price
indices (i.e. unit values of aggregate or manufactures exports depending on availabil-
ity) from IFS, WDI, and the central bank and statistical institutes of South Korea and
Turkey.
Exchange rates: The real effective and nominal exchange rates are extracted from IFS,
and BIS, and domestic central bank and statistics institutes.
Per capita real GDP: They are extracted from WDI in constant international 2005 prices.
Credit: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share
of GDP. Given the inconsistency between a stock and flow ratio, it is calculated using
the following deflation method as in Beck (2002): 100*
0.5∗[Creditt
Pet
+
Creditt−1
Pet−1 ]
GDPt/Pat
where Credit
is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private
sector, Pe is end-of period CPI and Pa is average annual CPI, and GDP is in local
currency. Raw data are extracted from the electronic version of the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS).
Population and Urbanization rates (POP and Urban) are extracted from WDI.
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2. Hansen Test of Overidentifying Restrictions
Insert Table 6 Here
3. Difference-in-Hansen Test of Exogeneity of Instruments
Insert Table 7 Here
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Figure 1: Exchange Rate Uncertainty for Subset of Countries, 1978-2005
Notes: Average refers to the average annual real exchange rate uncertainty of all 28
countries. Right axis refers to the case of Argentina.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Real Export Growth (%)
Total North South Numberof Obs Y ears
Partners
Algeria 8.43 -2.33 14.95 126 775 80-04
Argentina 4.14 0.55 5.30 194 2,138 80-05
Bolivia 10.16 9.94 10.33 124 911 80-05
Brazil 7.35 5.18 7.72 219 3,463 83-05
Chile 8.65 15.01 6.36 187 1,823 83-05
China 20.68 24.68 20.06 214 3,338 87-05
Colombia 8.70 5.84 9.50 215 2,650 78-05
Costa Rica 11.58 19.61 8.72 154 1,362 86-05
Ecuador 9.58 11.58 8.51 156 1,290 80-05
Egypt 13.27 9.28 14.35 194 2,483 81-05
Hong Kong 7.36 9.40 7.02 201 4,317 78-05
India 13.22 10.19 13.70 224 4,608 78-05
Indonesia 23.38 19.39 24.24 217 3,083 79-05
Jordan 10.74 11.84 7.67 167 1,861 81-05
Malaysia 16.88 13.05 17.56 225 3,947 78-05
Mexico 12.12 11.28 12.32 217 2,370 86-05
Morocco 13.31 11.99 13.56 183 2,495 78-05
Pakistan 12.06 9.80 12.48 213 3,405 82-05
Paraguay 4.66 -3.11 9.65 115 777 83-05
Philippines 7.77 6.31 8.13 210 2,983 81-05
Singapore 9.90 12.28 9.38 220 3,266 79-05
South Korea 14.71 11.98 15.15 226 4,386 78-05
Syria -4.25 4.35 -7.64 145 516 95-05
Thailand 18.72 14.44 19.47 223 4,254 78-05
Tunisia 10.60 9.67 10.90 184 2,148 80-05
Turkey 22.45 22.23 22.52 219 3,382 78-05
Uruguay 7.48 -0.22 10.88 169 1,572 83-05
Venezuela 3.22 -0.36 4.46 161 1,692 83-05
Notes: Total, North, and South refer to the real manufactures export growth of sample countries to the
world, North, and South, respectively. Number of partners refer to the number of trading partners in
the sample.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
X/GDP X/Trade N/X S/X RGDPC Credit σ Pop Urban
Algeria 0.5 2.0 58.4 41.6 5,517 31.8 0.0010 26 53.5
Argentina 3.1 28.8 35.1 64.9 10,160 16.5 0.0114 34 87.6
Bolivia 4.0 25.7 76.6 23.4 2,753 32.3 0.0347 7 56.4
Brazil 4.9 52.8 55.6 44.4 6,880 49.2 0.0028 159 77.2
Chile 9.7 39.6 62.6 37.4 8,950 57.7 0.0005 14 84.5
China 16.9 80.5 47.6 52.4 2,980 98.8 0.0012 1,210 32.4
Colombia 3.3 26.6 39.2 60.8 5,430 27.6 0.0007 34 68.3
Costa Rica 11.9 38.1 53.9 46.1 7,265 17.9 0.0002 4 55.2
Ecuador 1.2 5.3 23.7 76.3 4,553 22.2 0.0024 11 55.9
Egypt 2.1 28.9 57.3 42.7 3,608 38.1 0.0027 59 43.2
Hong Kong 89.8 84.1 53.0 47.0 21,675 147.7 0.0002 6 97.1
India 4.7 64.6 54.3 45.7 1,944 24.6 0.0003 875 25.8
Indonesia 9.5 33.7 52.7 47.3 3,071 28.1 0.0039 183 33.5
Jordan 10.2 44.2 21.1 78.9 4,128 66.7 0.0003 4 73.2
Malaysia 42.5 53.2 58.2 41.8 7,773 95.3 0.0004 19 52.8
Mexico 15.1 66.1 91.9 8.1 7,275 18.7 0.0013 91 73.2
Morocco 7.8 45.9 65.7 34.3 3,534 35.3 0.0002 25 48.6
Pakistan 9.4 72.9 63.0 37.0 2,254 23.3 0.0003 119 31.5
Paraguay 1.7 12.5 44.6 55.4 5,029 20.3 0.0018 5 51.3
Philippines 17.4 52.8 72.4 27.6 3,331 34.1 0.0008 65 50.9
Singapore 94.7 65.8 48.5 51.5 20,970 98.7 0.0001 3 100.0
South Korea 24.1 82.9 58.7 41.3 10,405 62.3 0.0005 43 71.5
Syria 2.5 9.0 28.0 72.0 1,999 9.2 0.0006 17 51.6
Thailand 20.4 54.5 60.7 39.3 4,888 84.1 0.0004 55 29.4
Tunisia 16.4 56.9 74.6 25.4 5,653 60.0 0.0002 8 58.9
Turkey 6.3 61.9 62.9 37.1 4,727 15.4 0.0013 58 57.6
Uruguay 6.2 41.2 33.4 66.6 9,036 33.6 0.0010 3 89.8
Venezuela 3.7 13.8 56.5 43.5 7,571 24.4 0.0064 22 86.5
Notes: X/GDP and X/Trade refer to the share of manufactures exports in GDP and total merchandise
exports of country i, N/X and S/X refer to the share of manufactures exports to the North and South in
total manufactures exports, respectively. RGDPC is average real GDP per capita in 2005 international
prices for the period analyzed for country i, Credit is the share of real private credit by deposit money
banks and other financial institutions to real GDP, Sigma is the exchange rate uncertainty, Pop is total
population in millions, Urban is the percentage share of urban population.
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Table 3: Basic Model: Effects of Exchange Rate Uncertainty
σNorth σSouth South #ofInst. #ofGroups/Obs
East and South East Asian Countries
China -0.036 -0.020 -0.008 42 186/2825
Hong Kong 0.002 0.004 -0.011 56 177/3777
India -0.044*** 0.001 0.058*** 101 185/3804
Indonesia 0.221*** 0.245*** 0.070** 92 185/2601
Malaysia -0.008 0.005 0.072*** 50 183/3278
Pakistan -0.032** -0.074*** 0.054** 48 172/2905
Philippines -0.012 -0.080** 0.017 79 164/2449
Singapore 0.047* 0.009 -0.034* 53 178/2742
South Korea 0.003 -0.028* 0.028* 52 184/3709
Thailand 0.022 0.022 0.084*** 52 182/3588
Latin American Countries
Argentina 0.039 0.010 0.049** 93 180/1815
Bolivia 0.021 0.099 0.073 73 64/775
Brazil -0.009 -0.056*** 0.036*** 64 177/2942
Chile -0.009 -0.072** 0.0005 81 126/1535
Colombia -0.022 -0.048** 0.077*** 56 137/2140
Costa Rica 0.212* -0.003 -0.008 36 97/1128
Ecuador -0.162** -0.111* 0.012 52 94/1062
Mexico 0.139*** 0.024 0.010 52 153/1936
Paraguay 0.192** 0.164 0.093 46 57/652
Uruguay -0.036 0.062* 0.038 83 115/1308
Venezuela 0.132* 0.118** 0.031 67 112/1410
MENA Countries
Algeria 0.150 0.104 -0.071 46 69/545
Egypt -0.316*** -0.252*** 0.115*** 70 154/2048
Jordan -0.114 -0.106 0.077 71 127/1525
Morocco 0.011 0.027 0.0002 56 134/2018
Syria 0.482*** 0.443*** -0.188 33 90/348
Tunisia -0.031 0.00004 -0.001 73 125/1751
Turkey -0.058** 0.034 0.060* 80 180/2875
Mean 0.068 0.012 0.056
Median 0.089 -0.052 0.059
Notes: σNorth and σSouth refer to the impact factor of exchange rate uncertainty in South-North and
South-South trade, respectively. It is measured as the joint effect of one standard deviation increase in
σ on bilateral exports growth. South refer to the joint effect of South-South trade. # of Inst. and #
of Groups/Obs refer to the number of instruments, and the number of groups and observations in each
estimation. Mean and Median are given only for the statistically significant coefficient estimates. *, **,
and *** refer to p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table 4: The Role of Financial Depth
σNorth σSouth Credit South #ofInst. #ofGroups/Obs
East and South East Asian Countries
China -0.101*** -0.093** 0.272 -0.008 44 186/2825
Hong Kong -0.021* -0.016 0.297 -0.023 39 177/2328
India -0.099*** -0.052* -0.259 0.057*** 103 185/3804
Indonesia 0.088** 0.108*** -0.249* 0.064** 94 185/2601
Malaysia 0.092 0.104 -0.345 0.072*** 52 183/3278
Pakistan -0.046*** -0.081*** -0.259 0.056*** 50 172/2905
Philippines 0.054 -0.017 0.505*** 0.010 81 164/24449
Singapore 0.067** 0.027* -0.679*** -0.032* 55 178/2742
South Korea 0.160 0.126 -0.851** 0.029* 54 184/3709
Thailand -0.014 -0.016 0.039 0.086*** 54 182/3588
Latin American Countries
Argentina 0.058** 0.022 0.440*** 0.051** 95 130/1815
Bolivia -0.136 -0.099 1.106 0.057 75 64/775
Brazil 0.016 -0.034** 0.181*** 0.038*** 66 177/2942
Chile -0.007 -0.070** 0.211 0.006 83 126/1535
Colombia -0.022 -0.048* -1.004* 0.077*** 58 137/2140
Costa Rica 0.210* -0.004 0.584 -0.009 38 97/1128
Ecuador -0.154* -0.110* -0.253 0.009 54 94/1062
Mexico 0.047 -0.064 -0.643** 0.009 54 153/1936
Paraguay 0.269** 0.249* 0.751* 0.082 48 57/652
Uruguay -0.074 0.021 0.040 0.031 85 115/1308
Venezuela 0.220* 0.193* 0.844** 0.018 69 112/1410
MENA Countries
Algeria 0.140 0.136 0.377 -0.058 48 69/545
Egypt -0.446*** -0.382*** 0.475 0.119*** 72 154/2048
Jordan -0.158 -0.148 -0.014 0.080 73 127/1525
Morocco 0.065 0.085 -0.483* 0.002 58 134/2018
Syria 0.268** 0.256* 3.358*** -0.219* 35 90/348
Tunisia -0.107 -0.062 0.036 -0.001 75 125/1751
Turkey -0.124*** -0.036 -0.398** 0.063* 82 180/2875
Mean 0.014 -0.003 0.136 0.035
Median 0.019 -0.048 -0.249 0.057
Notes: Credit refers to the joint effect of Credit. For other variable definitions please refer to Table 3.
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Table 5: The Role of Financial Depth for Trade with North and South
σNorth σSouth Credit Credit South #of #of
(North) (South) Inst. Groups/Obs
East and South East Asian Countries
China -0.138*** -0.092** 1.366** 0.118 0.015 46 186/2825
Hong Kong -0.020 -0.016 0.175 0.316 -0.022 41 177/2328
India -0.130*** -0.042 -0.475 -0.165 0.072*** 105 185/3804
Indonesia 0.114** 0.077* -0.234* -0.273* 0.003 96 185/2601
Malaysia -0.061 0.139 0.177 -0.455 0.141** 54 183/3278
Pakistan -0.047*** -0.080*** 0.208 -0.411 0.063*** 52 172/2905
Philippines 0.074* -0.024 0.404*** 0.547** -0.001 83 164/2449
Singapore 0.064** Absent -0.611*** Absent Absent 57 178/2742
South Korea -0.194 0.206 -0.560 -0.918** 0.137** 56 184/3709
Thailand -0.043* -0.007 0.047 0.037 0.089*** 56 182/3588
Latin American Countries
Argentina 0.061*** 0.021 0.450** 0.427** 0.050** 97 130/1815
Bolivia -0.110 -0.113 1.220 1.011 0.044 77 64/775
Brazil 0.007 -0.032** 0.110** 0.195*** 0.040*** 68 177/2942
Chile -0.010 -0.064* -0.502 0.471 -0.014 85 126/1535
Colombia -0.003 -0.054** -1.473* -0.855 0.085*** 60 137/2140
Costa Rica 0.154 -0.019 1.970** 0.195 0.156** 40 97/1128
Ecuador -0.156* -0.109 -0.410 -0.146 0.020 56 94/1062
Mexico 0.484** -0.222* 1.416* -1.411*** -0.204** 56 153/1936
Paraguay 0.308*** 0.243* 1.206** 0.411 0.052 50 57/652
Uruguay -0.075 0.030 0.316 -0.046 0.047 87 115/1308
Venezuela 0.125 0.240** 0.074 1.188*** 0.101 71 112/1410
MENA Countries
Algeria 0.116 0.134 0.211 0.446 -0.047 50 69/545
Egypt -0.456*** -0.364 0.393 0.560 0.136 74 154/2048
Jordan 0.045 -0.226* 0.180 0.030 -0.078 75 127/1525
Morocco 0.103 0.064 -0.833*** -0.250 -0.013 60 134/2018
Syria 0.164 0.312** 3.205** 3.498** -0.304* 37 90/348
Tunisia -0.033 -0.088 0.160 -0.070 -0.034 77 125/1751
Turkey -0.131*** -0.037 -0.659*** -0.328 0.063* 84 180/2875
Mean 0.0003 0.009 0.486 0.407 0.032
Median -0.043 -0.054 0.404 0.311 0.068
Notes: Credit(North) and Credit(South) refer to the joint effect of Credit on South-North and South-
South trade, respectively. For other variable definitions please refer to Table 3.
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Table 6: The Hansen Test of Overidentifying Restrictions
Table 3 Table 4 Table 5
East and South East Asian Countries
China 0.12 0.12 0.07
Hong Kong 0.10 0.17 0.17
India 0.29 0.27 0.27
Indonesia 0.16 0.24 0.17
Malaysia 0.26 0.26 0.27
Pakistan 0.33 0.24 0.22
Philippines 0.20 0.29 0.29
Singapore 0.20 0.20 0.19
South Korea 0.19 0.23 0.22
Thailand 0.17 0.18 0.18
Latin American Countries
Argentina 0.34 0.38 0.36
Bolivia 0.91 0.89 0.91
Brazil 0.74 0.83 0.83
Chile 0.30 0.26 0.29
Colombia 0.37 0.36 0.35
Costa Rica 0.25 0.21 0.11
Ecuador 0.29 0.23 0.25
Mexico 0.35 0.30 0.31
Paraguay 0.56 0.51 0.46
Uruguay 0.35 0.28 0.56
Venezuela 0.44 0.38 0.38
MENA Countries
Algeria 0.34 0.51 0.46
Egypt 0.25 0.16 0.15
Jordan 0.35 0.36 0.38
Morocco 0.42 0.45 0.45
Syria 0.16 0.21 0.22
Tunisia 0.26 0.28 0.28
Turkey 0.40 0.37 0.37
Notes: p-values for Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for Tables 3-5.
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Table 7: The Difference-in-Hansen Test of Exogeneity of Instruments
Table 3 Table 4 Table 5
East and South East Asian Countries
China 0.49 0.54 0.53
Hong Kong 0.10 0.20 0.18
India 0.72 0.61 0.59
Indonesia 0.77 0.65 0.42
Malaysia 0.64 0.60 0.60
Pakistan 0.30 0.15 0.13
Philippines 0.58 0.72 0.72
Singapore 0.15 0.16 0.27
South Korea 0.01 0.01 0.01
Thailand 0.36 0.37 0.37
Latin American Countries
Argentina 0.39 0.54 0.45
Bolivia 0.98 0.95 0.98
Brazil 0.79 0.72 0.73
Chile 0.42 0.36 0.47
Colombia 0.50 0.50 0.49
Costa Rica 0.09 0.07 0.03
Ecuador 0.71 0.75 0.74
Mexico 0.39 0.35 0.44
Paraguay 0.61 0.53 0.47
Uruguay 0.44 0.42 0.91
Venezuela 0.18 0.08 0.07
MENA Countries
Algeria 0.36 0.60 0.54
Egypt 0.87 0.72 0.72
Jordan 0.77 0.77 0.79
Morocco 0.15 0.17 0.17
Syria 0.64 0.80 0.92
Tunisia 0.04 0.03 0.02
Turkey 0.83 0.79 0.77
Notes: P-values for difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM instruments for levels in Tables
3-5.
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